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Private Offerings in the Age
of Surveillance Capitalism and
Targeted Advertising
Social media platforms, as well as the internet more broadly, have
fundamentally altered many aspects of modern life. In particular, platforms’
targeted advertising mechanisms have revolutionized how companies reach
consumers by providing advertisers more effective tools for reaching consumers
and by tailoring content to consumers’ individual interests. Advertising, in
many respects, has always been targeted—it has always sought to reach and
influence a certain set of consumers. Today’s targeted advertising, however,
allows advertisers to influence consumer behavior on an increasingly granular
and intimate level, further skewing the power imbalance between advertisers
and consumers. This new dynamic, together with changes to advertising
rules for private securities offerings, creates a regulatory gap: should issuers
be allowed to promote private offerings through targeted advertising on
social media?
This Note examines that gap and considers how contemporary targeted
advertising mechanisms interact with the law of private securities, which has
long restricted issuers’ use of advertising in promoting private offerings. These
and other restrictions reflect an understanding that private securities are more
volatile (and, as a result, often yield higher returns) than public securities. In
2013, though, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission” or
“SEC”) lifted a longstanding ban on the use of general solicitations for private
offerings, paving the way for issuers to employ widely disseminated
advertisements to solicit investors. But the Commission did not anticipate—and
could not have anticipated—the ways in which social media and “surveillance
capitalism” would change advertising, and the current regulatory regime
does not contemplate how targeted advertising fits into the private
offering landscape.
With the ability not only to target but also to influence specific
consumers, private securities issuers can wield new power with targeted
advertising. Consumers may understandably be enticed by promises of high
returns, and advertisements for private offerings can now appear in consumers’
social media newsfeed alongside personal and professional content. More
importantly, targeted advertising algorithms curate personalized content with
the goal of imperceptibly and gradually changing consumer thinking, perhaps
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leading a user to finally click on an advertisement she once scrolled past. While
such a dynamic may be acceptable, and even desirable, with respect to material
goods and services, it raises complicated and pressing concerns in the context of
private securities offerings. This Note proposes modifications to the private
securities rules that would prohibit the use of targeted advertising in private
offerings—a change that would adequately remediate the harms posed and
provide clarity to the many stakeholders involved.
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INTRODUCTION
In the first initial public offering1 of 2020, mail-order mattress
startup Casper did something commentators called “unusual.”2 The
company acknowledged a risk that the “use of social media and
influencers may materially and adversely affect [its] reputation or
subject [it] to fines or other penalties.”3 Considering how social media
has become a pivotal part of our economy, this acknowledgement should
come as no surprise. And Casper is not the first to acknowledge the
potential impact of social media and influencers on its value as a
company: both Madewell and Peloton included similar risk assessments
in recent filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the
“Commission” or “SEC”).4 Even in the seemingly siloed and abstract
world of securities, social media and the internet are playing an
increasingly central role in how information is exchanged.
In the “age of surveillance capitalism,”5 information is generated
at unprecedented rates.6 Every keystroke becomes a data point, which
1.
An initial public offering, commonly known as an IPO, is “the first time a company offers
its shares of capital stock to the general public.” Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 25, 2013), https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/generalresources/news-alerts/alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletins-17 [https://perma.cc/V7MY-67RR].
2.
Sarah Frier, Casper Warns of an Unusual Risk in Its IPO Filing: Influencers, BLOOMBERG
(Jan. 10, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-10/casper-warns-ofan-unusual-risk-in-its-ipo-filing-influencers [https://perma.cc/A2FG-AFPZ]; Avery Hartmans, The
6 Most Surprising and Unusual Takeaways from Casper’s IPO Filing, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 13, 2020,
2:54 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/casper-sleep-mattress-ipo-surprising-takeaways-from
-s-1-filing-2020-1#casper-warned-that-influencers-could-cause-its-business-to-take-a-hit-1
[https://perma.cc/QRP3-B9TL].
3.
Casper Sleep Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1) 17, 32–33 (Jan. 10, 2020).
4.
Frier, supra note 2.
5.
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN
FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2019).
6.
See Devin Pickell, What Is Big Data? A Complete Guide, G2 LEARNING HUB (Aug. 22,
2018), https://learn.g2.com/big-data [https://perma.cc/98PE-UN7P] (discussing the astounding
rates at which information is created over the internet, both directly through social media posts
and indirectly through information gathered by smart watches and the like).
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is then available for use by companies and other actors seeking to
discern information about particular segments of the market.
Specifically, companies can use this information to deploy targeted
advertisements, which proponents argue can be useful for both
advertisers and consumers.7 Now that advertisers can not only target
but also influence consumers, targeted advertising raises complicated
questions about what exactly should be advertised and to whom.
Particularly, there are profound implications for the offer and sale
of private securities, which, until recently, could not be promoted
through advertising.
In a traditional public securities offering, issuers8 must register
their securities with the SEC and disclose information about the
company, the company’s financial health, and the securities the
company is offering.9 When it comes to securities investments,
information is power. With more information, prospective investors are
in a better position to decide whether and where to invest their money.10
Information disclosures ensure that investors are informed and
educated participants in the securities markets, mitigating the risk of
potentially devastating financial loss.11 By contrast, issuers are not
subject to these registration and disclosure requirements for private
securities offerings,12 which are considered riskier than public offerings
7.
The benefit is that advertisers can know exactly to whom they should advertise, making
their advertising efforts more effective. Consumers, in turn, are shown advertisements that are
relevant only to them, making their browsing more interesting and efficient. Maya Frai, Targeted
Advertising: The Good and the Bad, MEDIUM: ART + MKTG. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://artplus
marketing.com/targeted-advertising-the-good-and-the-bad-da469976310c [https://perma.cc/WP4G
-YSMM]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN THE NEXT TECH-ADE: A REPORT BY THE
STAFF OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 11 (2008), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/protecting-consumers-next-tech-ade-report-staff-federal-trade-commission
/p064101tech.pdf [https://perma.cc/4A3K-LB6P].
8.
This Note will use the term “issuer” to refer to companies that issue or attempt to issue
securities. See Guide to Definitions of Terms Used in Form D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/formddefinitions.htm (last updated Sept. 12, 2008)
[https://perma.cc/NY8J-RNL6] (providing definition for “issuer”).
9.
See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (making it unlawful to sell securities absent
an effective registration statement, which must disclose certain information to investors). Under
Section 5 of the Act, issuers must disclose information about the company, the security offered, the
company’s management, and the company’s financial health. The Laws that Govern the Securities
Industry, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html#sec
act1933 (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) [https://perma.cc/Y4QX-L944].
10. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 20–
21 (4th ed. 2015); see also U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 9 (discussing the purpose of
registration and the benefits of disclosing information to investors).
11. This is particularly true for individuals, as opposed to institutions, who wish to invest in
the securities markets, as discussed infra Section III.A.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2020). Regulation D provides
regulatory safe harbors through which issuers may conduct offerings that are “private” within the
meaning of the 1933 Act and therefore are exempt from the disclosure requirements imposed on
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because of this disclosure waiver.13 Still, private offerings are desirable
to issuers, who can raise capital without incurring the cost associated
with publicly offering securities, and to qualifying investors, who can
access riskier but often higher-return investments.14
Recent events, when considered together, have heightened the
investor risks associated with private offerings beyond what the law
should permit. First, in 2013, the SEC lifted the historic ban on
employing general advertisements and solicitations in private
offerings.15 The ban functioned as an important investor protection
mechanism, moderating the risks of private offerings by ensuring that
investors had preexisting relationships with issuers and were therefore
in a better position to discover information about a private offering.16
Now, in certain offerings, issuers may solicit investors for private
offerings
via
widely
disseminated
advertisements.17
Contemporaneously, targeted social media advertising and
“surveillance capitalism” began to fundamentally alter the way society
receives information, including information about the securities
markets.18 Social media platforms have developed algorithms that not
only predict but also influence user behavior over time by curating
individualized posts and advertisements. 19 Taken together, these
changes have created a regulatory gap: How should the federal
securities laws treat targeted advertisements in the context of private
securities placements?
public offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. Two of those exemptions, known as Rule 506(b) and Rule
506(c), will be the focus of this Note. Id. § 230.506(b)-(c).
13. Cf. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 9 (discussing the importance of disclosing to
investors certain information about investments).
14. Greg Oguss, Should Size or Wealth Equal Sophistication in Federal Securities Laws?, 107
NW. U. L. REV. 285, 286–87 (2015).
15. For the purposes of this Note and the relevant securities regulations, a general
solicitation (or general advertisement) refers to an advertisement that is broadcast over mass
media such as the radio or in a newspaper. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2020); infra Section I.A.2
(discussing the meaning of general solicitation).
16. See infra Section I.B (discussing the 2013 removal of the general solicitations ban). Lifting
the ban was intended to strike a new balance between allowing issuers to raise capital and giving
investors access to higher-return investments, while still protecting investors from increased risks
involved with private placements. See Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9,415,
Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,774 (July 24, 2013) [hereinafter SEC
Release on Rule 506].
17. Although this Note will argue that targeted advertisements should not be considered
general solicitation for purposes of compliance with federal securities laws, it will demonstrate
how removal of the general solicitations ban has paved the way for use of mechanisms like targeted
advertisements to promote securities offerings.
18. See infra Part II.
19. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA (Exposure Labs 2020); see ZUBOFF, supra note 5, at 293–94
(describing three concepts of “behavior modification”: tuning, herding, and conditioning).

6 - Claxton_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1192

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

6/7/2021 9:01 PM

[Vol. 74:4:1187

Part I of this Note examines the existing legal framework that
governs the private securities markets, particularly private offerings
conducted under Rule 506. It also examines the historical purposes
behind the general solicitations ban and SEC guidance on how the
internet fits into the securities regulation framework. In Part II, the
discussion turns to consider targeted advertising, highlighting social
media platforms’ capacity to powerfully manipulate users while still
restricting certain advertising content. Part III evaluates how the
potential use of targeted advertising in private offerings could cause
harm to investors, markets, and issuers. It then considers the
implications for the social media companies themselves. Finally, Part
IV proposes that the SEC issue guidance and, eventually, engage in
formal rulemaking to prohibit the use of targeted advertising in private
securities offerings. Such an outright prohibition, this Note argues, is
the only solution that will adequately protect investors against the
potential harms posed by allowing targeted advertisements and social
media to facilitate private offerings.
I. BACKGROUND AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK
FOR PRIVATE SECURITIES OFFERINGS
Following the 1929 Stock Market Crash and the Great
Depression, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”
or “Act”) to install protections for investors and restore confidence in
the country’s financial markets.20 Specifically, the Act requires
companies to register their securities with the SEC and disclose various
types of information to investors in making public securities offerings.21
The Act’s public offering requirements often prove too financially
onerous for small businesses, though, leaving many firms without
access to capital through the offer and sale of securities.22 To facilitate
capital formation for smaller firms, in 1982, the Commission
promulgated Regulation D under the 1933 Act, which clarifies and
expands the registration exemptions in section 4 of the Act by
enumerating regulatory safe harbors through which issuers can
conduct private offerings.23
20. Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the SEC’s “Accredited
Investor” Definition Under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733, 737–38 (2009).
21. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
22. Jason A. Tiemeier, Note, Striking a Balance Between Protecting Investors and Promoting
Small Business: The New Rule 506, Accredited Investor Standards, and the Guidelines of General
Solicitation, 10 OHIO ST. BUS. L.J. 101, 103 (2015) (noting that the “time and expense” required to
conduct a public offering makes it very difficult for small and emerging businesses to raise capital
through the public markets).
23. Id.
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Because private offerings are exempted from the registration
and disclosure requirements of section 5, they provide an attractive
option for issuers looking to access large amounts of capital at relatively
low cost.24 By the same token, investors value having access to private
securities because they can have exponentially higher returns than
traditional publicly traded securities.25 In lowering the barriers for
issuers seeking to raise capital, however, Regulation D also removes
key protective mechanisms for the investors who provide that capital—
namely, the disclosure and registration requirements of the 1933 Act.
To mitigate the effects of this removal, the SEC instituted rules that
restrict who can invest in private securities and how issuers can
conduct private offerings.26
A. Private Offering Exemptions Under Regulation D and Rule 506
Rule 506 of Regulation D provides a nonexclusive safe harbor
that allows issuers to conduct private securities offerings, as permitted
by the section 4(a)(2) exemption from section 5’s requirements. 27 In
other words, if issuers follow the rules provided in Regulation D, they
can reap the benefits of conducting a private offering without fear of
violating the federal securities laws. Rule 506(b), the original safe
harbor for private offerings, contains two key investor protection
devices. First, issuers may offer private securities under Rule 506(b) to
“an unlimited number of ‘accredited investors’ ” and “to no more than
35 non-accredited investors who meet certain ‘sophistication’
requirements.”28 Second, issuers may not solicit investors for a 506(b)
offering using general solicitations. In practice, this means that issuers

24. Id. at 101–02.
25. See Matt Levine, Opinion, Private Markets Could Be More Public, BLOOMBERG (June 19,
2019, 11:01 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-06-19/private-markets-couldbe-more-public [https://perma.cc/M226-XZGX] (noting that investments in private companies—
before a potential IPO—are likely to be more lucrative because that is when companies often
experience “explosive growth”).
26. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)-(c) (2020). Even with these investor protections in place, the
regulatory framework of private offerings has been criticized since its inception. See infra
Section III.A (discussing the historical issues and criticisms raised about the private securities
offering framework).
27. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,772–73.
28. Id. at 44,773; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii):
Each purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his purchaser
representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment, or
the issuer reasonably believes immediately prior to making any sale that such
purchaser comes within this description.
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can only solicit investors with whom they have a prior relationship.29
Together, the accredited investor limits and general solicitations ban
work to balance informational risks present in private offerings against
a desire to facilitate capital formation.
1. Accredited Investor Thresholds
An accredited investor can be an institution or a natural
person.30 A natural person is an accredited investor if she has a net
worth of at least $1 million,31 if she has an annual income of $200,000
for the prior two years, or if she and her spouse have a combined annual
income of $300,000.32 The SEC recently amended the definition of an
accredited investor to also include individuals considered
knowledgeable or highly educated on securities and financial markets.33
In theory, if an investor meets one of these financial or educational
thresholds, the law can assume a level of financial sophistication that
alleviates the information imbalance in private offerings.34

29. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,772–73; see also infra notes 41–43 and
accompanying text (discussing the purposes and application of the general solicitations ban).
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2020) (providing the definition of an “accredited investor”).
31. As required by the Dodd-Frank Act, the net worth calculation has been amended to
exclude the value of the investor’s primary residence. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited
Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9,287, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,891, 76 Fed.
Reg. 81,793, 81,794 (Dec. 29, 2011).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a). Accounting for inflation, today these figures would be roughly $2.8
million, $553,000, and $830,000, respectively. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/3C4X-YASS] (using the inflation calculator, compare each figure between March
1982 buying power and November 2020 buying power). But these financial thresholds have not
changed since their promulgation nearly forty years ago. Revision of Certain Exemptions from
Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6,389,
24 SEC Docket 1166, 1169 (Mar. 8, 1982) (proposing $1 million net worth and $200,000 income
thresholds for the accredited investor standard—the same thresholds still in place today). Many
wonder if they still adequately mitigate the asymmetry in the private markets. See, e.g., Tiemeier,
supra note 22, at 116 (“The accreditation standards have been questioned for their reliability, as
well as for their usefulness entirely because they are based solely on an investor’s wealth and
assets.” (footnote omitted)).
33. See Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Securities Act Release No. 10,734,
Exchange Act Release No. 87,784, 85 Fed. Reg. 2574 (proposed Jan. 15, 2020).
34. Tiemeier, supra note 22, at 104. According to the Commission, “[T]he accredited investor
definition is ‘intended to encompass those persons whose financial sophistication and ability to
sustain the risk of loss of investment or [ability to] fend for themselves render the protections of
the Securities Act’s registration process unnecessary.’ ” Amending the “Accredited Investor”
Definition, 85 Fed. Reg. at 2577 (first quoting Regulation D Revisions; Exemption for Certain
Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6,683, 52 Fed. Reg. 3015 (proposed Jan. 30,
1987); then citing SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953)).
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2. General Solicitations in Private Offerings
Previously, issuers conducting private securities offerings could
not use general solicitations to locate investors.35 Rule 502(c) of
Regulation D provides that general solicitations may include but are
not limited to “[a]ny advertisement, article, notice or other
communication published in any newspaper, magazine, or similar
media or broadcast over television or radio” and “[a]ny seminar or
meeting whose attendees have been invited by any general solicitation
or general advertising.”36 Through interpretive releases, the
Commission has confirmed that advertisements on unrestricted
websites are general solicitations.37 Ultimately, “Whether there has
been a general solicitation is a fact-specific determination.”38 In general,
where many of the individuals contacted are not financially
sophisticated and are selected for contact through broad, undiscerning
methods, an issuer likely engages in general solicitation.39
Practically, Rule 502(c)’s prohibition of general solicitations
means that issuers relying on the 506(b) exemption can offer private
securities only to investors with whom they have a prior relationship.40
If issuers and investors have a preexisting relationship, the issuer need
not rely on an advertisement to make contact with the investor. The
theory underlying the ban on general solicitations has been historically
35. See Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, 85 Fed. Reg at 2,601 (discussing the
Commission’s creation of Rule 506(b), which provides a private offering exemption under which
issuers may engage in general solicitation).
36. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(1)-(2) (2020).
37. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,773. “General solicitation” is not actually
defined in Regulation D. Rather, the Commission provides examples of what it believes qualifies
as a general solicitation in order to afford flexibility to issuers seeking to rely on Rule 506’s
exemptions. Id. Therefore, the examples explicitly listed are impermissible general solicitations,
but items not listed may be acceptable, depending on the SEC’s interpretation. Thus, the lack of
bright-line rules on what exactly constitutes general solicitation gives issuers reason to hesitate
about conducting Rule 506 offerings. See Tiemeier, supra note 22, at 123 (“An issuer should not be
forced to use one rule out of fear that it will inadvertently violate an unclear provision of another,
especially when the rule is predicated on helping small businesses get access to the capital that
they need to survive.”).
38. Securities Act Rules: Questions and Answers of General Applicability, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm
(last
updated Nov. 6, 2017) [https://perma.cc/RRA2-6THG] (Answer to Question 256.27).
39. See id. (“[T]he greater the number of persons without financial experience, sophistication
or any prior personal or business relationship with the issuer that are contacted by an issuer or
persons acting on its behalf through impersonal, non-selective means of communication, the more
likely the communications are part of a general solicitation.”).
40. See Tiemeier, supra note 22, at 105 (“[T]he SEC staff has relied upon the idea of
preexisting relationships to interpret whether an action constitutes general solicitation.”); Ze’-ev
Eiger, Practice Pointers on Navigating the Securities Act’s Prohibition on General Solicitation and
General Advertising, MORRISON & FOERSTER 1 (2018), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/
160600practicepointersgeneralsolicitation.pdf [https://perma.cc/8RMF-B7VV].
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that “public advertising is incompatible with a claim of exemption” for
private offerings.41 Put differently, if an issuer is claiming a private
offering exemption from section 5’s requirements, publicly advertising
that offering via general solicitations feels inapposite. If an investor has
a preexisting relationship with an issuer, the law assumes that the
investor has “a better opportunity to make an informed decision” about
the security being offered.42 After years of skepticism from industry
actors regarding its efficacy, however, the Commission lifted the ban to
allow for general solicitations in certain private offerings.43
B. Lifting the Ban on General Solicitations with Rule 506(c)
In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart Our Businesses Act
(the “JOBS Act”), which directed the SEC to lift the longstanding ban
on the use of general solicitations in private offerings. 44 The JOBS Act
sought to expand the means by which issuers could reach investors,
opening the potential field of investors beyond those with whom the
issuer had a preexisting relationship.45 The Commission implemented
this change in 2013 by amending Rule 506 to include a new exemption,
506(c), which provides a safe harbor that allows issuers to attract
investors using general solicitations so long as issuers satisfy certain
conditions.46 Under Rule 506(c) of Regulation D, issuers may offer
securities to investors via general solicitations if (1) those who
purchase the securities are “accredited investors” and (2) the
issuer takes “reasonable steps to verify” that all purchasers are
accredited investors.47
The new Rule 506(c) relies on the same accredited investor
definition as 506(b) discussed above,48 but it also imposes a “reasonable
steps” verification requirement on issuers seeking to claim the
41. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,774.
42. Tiemeier, supra note 22, at 105; see also Patrick Daugherty, Rethinking the Ban on
General Solicitation, 38 EMORY L.J. 67, 71–72 (1989).
43. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves JOBS Act Requirement to
Lift General Solicitation Ban (July 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-124sec-approves-jobs-act-requirement-lift-general-solic [https://perma.cc/3W8Q-M4PJ]; infra notes
52–53 (discussing drawbacks of the ban).
44. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,772. The JOBS Act aims to make it easier
for companies, particularly small businesses, to access funding through the capital markets.
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings: A Small Entity Compliance Guide, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/general-solicitation-small-entity-compliance-guide.htm
(last updated Sept. 20, 2013) [https://perma.cc/3EVX-2ZPB].
45. Tiemeier, supra note 22, at 108.
46. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,774.
47. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (2020).
48. See supra Section I.A.1.
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exemption under the new Rule. 49 In guidance about Rule 506(c), the
Commission wrote that “the purpose of the verification mandate is to
address concerns, and reduce the risk, that the use of general
solicitation in Rule 506 offerings could result in sales of securities to
investors who are not, in fact, accredited investors.” 50 Recognizing the
potential constraints of a bright-line rule, the Commission prioritized
flexibility in enumerating a list of ways issuers may verify the
accreditation status of potential investors.51
Removal of the general solicitations ban is a positive
development for small issuers who are new to the private securities
markets. The ban perpetuated an “old boys’ club,” as one commentator
put it, where only issuers who had preexisting relationships had access
to qualifying investors.52 Issuers can now find new investors through
advertisement, breaking up this exclusive “club.” Relaxing the
prohibition on general solicitation also alleviates expenses that persist
even in lower-cost private offerings, such as those associated with
printing offering materials as opposed to transmitting them via email.53
When considering changes to Rule 506 and eliminating the ban
on general solicitations, the Commission acknowledged that the change
“may affect the behavior of issuers and other market participants in
ways [that] could compromise investor protection.”54 It took steps to
address some of those concerns by implementing the accredited investor

49. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(ii).
50. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,776. The 2013 Rule amendment did not
alter Rule 506(b), which is still available for use by issuers under its original terms. Id.
51. Id. at 44,776–77. Rule 506(c) provides four “non-exclusive and non-mandatory
[verification] methods,” all of which entail (1) obtaining a written affirmation by the purchaser of
her status as an accredited investor and (2) an independent verification of that status by reviewing
tax documents, bank statements, and other similarly reliable documentation. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(c)(2)(ii)(A)-(D). Additionally, in guidance about the new Rule 506(c), the SEC provided a
list of factors issuers should consider in verifying investor status through a “facts and
circumstances analysis,” including:
[T]he nature of the purchaser and the type of accredited investor that the purchaser
claims to be; the amount and type of information that the issuer has about the
purchaser; and the nature of the offering, such as the manner in which the purchaser
was solicited to participate in the offering, and the terms of the offering, such as a
minimum investment amount.
SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,778.
52. Letter from Keith Paul Bishop to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2–3
(Oct. 1, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R4SFFDMM]. This feedback loop likely disadvantaged new and small businesses, many of whom may
have been female- or minority-owned. Id.
53. Letter from Joseph McLaughlin to Nancy M. Morris, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2
(Nov. 12, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-18-07/s71807-61.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SYTC3VB].
54. SEC Release on Rule 506, supra note 16, at 44,774.
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verification framework mentioned above.55 In doing so, the Commission
relaxed limitations on how to communicate with investors without
evaluating the methodology that determines the actual pool of investors
(i.e., the accredited investor financial thresholds). That pool has
ballooned from once including only approximately 1.6% of U.S.
households to today including 13% of U.S. households. 56 This
exponential increase in the number of potential accredited investors,
coupled with technological advancements, provides compelling reasons
to believe that the private offering rules need yet another update.
C. SEC Guidance on Internet Use in Private Offerings
Since the 1990s, the SEC has been attentive to how social media
and the internet impact the securities regulation landscape. 57 The
internet provides issuers with unparalleled access to investors and new
ways to share information, no matter where investors are located, and
the ability to electronically transmit information (and forgo printing)
dramatically reduces an issuer’s costs. 58 With respect to private
markets specifically, the SEC noted in a recent proposal, “Given the rise
of the internet, social media, and other forms of communication,
information about issuers and other participants in the [private]
markets is more readily available to a wide range of market
participants.”59 Yet the private offering rules remained largely the same
until the 2013 JOBS Act.60 As discussed in more detail below, the SEC
has provided guidance, often in the form of no action letters, 61 to help
55. Id. at 44,776.
56. Letter from Christopher Gerold, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, to Vanessa
Countryman, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Mar. 16, 2020), https://www.nasaa.org/wpcontent/uploads/2020/03/NASAA-Accredited-Investor-Comment-Letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/ERU
9-6FD2]. “It is implausible that 16 million American households currently have both the financial
sophistication and the capacity to bear the kinds of investment losses that courts and prior
Commissions have considered essential prerequisites for participation in private offerings.” Id.
at 4–5.
57. See, e.g., Laura S. Unger, Acting Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at the
2001 Corporate Law Symposium at the University of Cincinnati School of Law: Raising Capital on
the Internet (Mar. 9, 2001), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch471.htm [https://perma.cc/A28PDC6U] (“The financial services industry has been uniquely susceptible to changes in technology
due to its inherently intangible nature.”).
58. Id.
59. Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, Securities Act Release No. 10,734,
Exchange Act Release No. 87,784, 85 Fed. Reg. 2,574, 2,594 (proposed Jan. 15, 2020).
60. See supra Section I.B; Amending the “Accredited Investor” Definition, 85 Fed. Reg.
at 2574.
61. A “No Action Letter” allows companies to ask if a particular course of action would, in the
Commission’s opinion, violate the securities laws. No Action Letters, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersnoactionhtm.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/54Y3-WDQX].
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issuers navigate compliance with the securities laws in an increasingly
internet-based world.
1. Securities and the Internet, Generally
The Commission’s website provides educational resources on
how to invest wisely when presented with securities investment
opportunities on the internet. In 2012, the SEC released an Investor
Alert explaining that the low cost and anonymity of social media make
it both an attractive option for fraudsters and difficult to bring bad
actors to justice.62 The Commission provides some classic smart
investing advice, such as being skeptical of offers that seem too good to
be true. It also provides internet-specific advice, like making sure to
configure social media privacy and security settings responsibly 63—a
good practice for social media use regardless of whether users seek
securities investments online.
The SEC frequently brings enforcement actions against
perpetrators of internet-based securities fraud and once maintained an
internet-specific enforcement arm called the Office of Internet
Enforcement. This arm merged with the Office of Market Intelligence
in 201064—perhaps owing to the fact that, as regulators have
acknowledged, “[t]he fundamental principles of securities regulation do
not change based on the medium,” 65 thus rendering an internet-specific
office unnecessary to achieving enforcement goals. The Commission’s
website also links to a report on international enforcement efforts with
respect to securities law violations perpetrated over the internet.66 But

62. Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., Investor Alert: Social Media and Investing – Avoiding Fraud,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 1 (2012), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/socialmediaandfraud.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PRK5-YEYH].
63. Id. at 2.
64. See Enforcement Internet Program, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/oig/
reportspubs/aboutoigaudit352finhtm.html#P29_2924
(last
updated
June
3,
2004)
[https://perma.cc/TNM8-K8S5]; see also Significant SEC Enforcement Actions Led by Office of
Internet Enforcement, JOHN REED STARK CONSULTING LLC, https://www.johnreedstark.com/secenforcement-matters/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/TV82-M3CP].
65. INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, REPORT ON SECURITIES ACTIVITY ON THE INTERNET III, at 1
(2003),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD159.pdf
[https://perma.cc/V75J6V7N].
66. See Off. of Int’l Affs., Enforcement, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/
about/offices/oia/enforce.htm (last updated Oct. 12, 2006) [https://perma.cc/2U8Q-CSCP] (section
titled “Internet Fraud,” which provides a link to the International Organization of Securities
Commissions Report on Securities Activity on the Internet III); see also INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’NS, supra note 65.

6 - Claxton_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1200

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

6/7/2021 9:01 PM

[Vol. 74:4:1187

the report has not been updated since 2003, making it nearly twenty
years old.67
In most cases, the internet simply provides a new medium for
violating securities laws rather than impacting the nature of the
violations in a legally substantive way.68 Fraud and other securities
violations perpetrated over the internet are regulated through the
usual channels, namely enforcement actions. There are numerous
examples of enforcement actions involving securities law violations on
social media—from pyramid schemes on Facebook to unregistered
securities promoted on Twitter and YouTube—that demonstrate
investors’ susceptibility to fraud conducted on these mediums. 69
In one particularly relevant example, the SEC brought an
enforcement action against defendants who used social media
advertisements, in addition to telephone and e-mail solicitations, to
target seniors in a Ponzi scheme that raised $1.2 billion before
collapsing.70 The fund, Woodbridge, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy,
owing $961 million in principal to investors.71 Fortunately, most of the
investors in this scheme recovered their money after a judge ordered a
$1 billion judgement against the fund and related corporate actors.72
Although case documents do not specify how Woodbridge’s scheme came
to the attention of the SEC, it seems probable that the large, public
bankruptcy proceeding could have attracted regulatory scrutiny. The
size and scope of this particular scam likely also made it easier to

67. By way of example, the report notes that “10 per cent of people in the world now have
access to the Internet.” INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 65, at 3. Today, almost sixty
percent of the world uses the internet. Global Digital Population as of January 2021, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 12,
2021) [https://perma.cc/5SJY-E7MK].
68. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 65, at 1 (“The fundamental principles of
securities regulation do not change based on the medium.”).
69. In 2014, the Commission cracked down on an operation in which fraudsters used Twitter
and Facebook accounts to lure investors into a pyramid scheme that promised weekly returns of
up to three percent. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Halts International Pyramid
Scheme
Being
Promoted
Through
Facebook
and
Twitter
(Mar.
5,
2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-44
[https://perma.cc/PQ8H-MHYN].
Another
enforcement action announced in 2019 halted a scheme involving the promotion of unregistered
securities via Twitter and YouTube. Litigation Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges
Nine Individuals and Companies for Roles in Microcap Scheme (Mar. 12, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2019/lr24419.htm [https://perma.cc/4J8F-P5L2].
70. Complaint at 3, SEC v. Davis, No. 2:18-cv-10481 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2018), ECF No. 1,
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2018/comp-pr2018-296-3.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMT8NAZ4].
71. Id. at 12.
72. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Court Orders $1 Billion Judgment Against
Operators of Woodbridge Ponzi Scheme Targeting Retail Investors (Jan. 28, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-3 [https://perma.cc/7MRE-YGAW]. Robert Shapiro,
Woodbridge’s former owner, was himself ordered to pay $100 million to recompense victims. Id.
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prosecute, and, arguably, regulators like the SEC cannot simply ignore
frauds of this magnitude.73 The case is an outlier in this regard: in 2018,
the median SEC enforcement action involved only $362,858 in
disgorgement of ill-gotten gains and penalties74—a mere fraction of the
$1 billion figure in Woodbridge. Nonetheless, Woodbridge is
representative of the Commission’s continued use of its normal
regulatory tools as it confronts internet-based fraud and securities
law violations.
2. Using the Internet to Conduct Private Offerings
In 1995, the Commission announced that promoting private
securities offerings on a public website constitutes a general solicitation
in violation of Rule 502(c). This is true even if prospective investors
must provide information before being able to access offering
documents.75 Later, in a matter called IPONET, the SEC determined
that the issuer did not engage in general solicitation when, after
verifying the accreditation status of investors who shared information,
the issuer provided verified investors with a password to access a
website containing offering information.76 Put differently, inviting
investors to participate in a specific private offering via a public website
qualifies as a general solicitation, but inviting them to share
information about their accreditation status or sophistication level
through a public website for the prospect of participating in future
73. See Urska Velikonja, Reporting Agency Performance: Behind the SEC’s Enforcement
Statistics, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 918–19 (2016) (“Output measures in enforcement are a
product of several factors, including (1) the prevalence of misconduct as well as (2) the agency’s
ability to detect and prosecute such misconduct.”). After it reviews the SEC Staff’s findings on a
matter, the Commission must approve pursuit of enforcement action before it moves forward to,
for example, the filing of a federal complaint or an administrative action. How Investigations Work,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/enforce/how-investigations-work.html (last
updated Jan. 27, 2017) [https://perma.cc/4FVS-S8YE]. It stands to reason that when something
like a $1.2 billion Ponzi scheme, calculated to prey on vulnerable investors, comes before the
Commissioners, they most often will choose to pursue enforcement.
74. DIV. OF ENF’T, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2019),
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/753L-JF8S].
75. Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Securities Act Release No. 7,233,
Exchange Act Release No. 36,345, Investment Company Act Release No. 21,399, 60 Fed. Reg.
53,458 (Oct. 6, 1995) (codified at 17 C.F.R pts. 231, 241, 271).
76. Eiger, supra note 40, at 5 (discussing the No-Action Letter the Commission issued in
IPONET); see also Heather Traeger & Kris Easter, Use of Social Media in Private Fund Offerings:
Perks, Perils, and Privacy, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 143, 150 (2013) (“While funds and intermediaries
involved in their offerings have been providing information about private offerings for some time
via password protected websites that enabled only qualified investors to view the offerings, the
[2013 JOBS Act changes] allow them to disseminate information more broadly.” (footnote
omitted)). After IPONET, the Commission found that allowing potential investors to merely selfverify their accreditation status before accessing a website containing offering information ran
afoul of Rule 502(c). Eiger, supra note 40, at 5–6.

6 - Claxton_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

1202

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

6/7/2021 9:01 PM

[Vol. 74:4:1187

offerings is acceptable under Rule 502(c).77 In 2015, the Commission
clarified that Rule 506(c), the new private offering exemption,
“may be available to issuers when offering or selling securities
through unrestricted, publicly available websites or other forms of
general solicitation.”78
In sum, although it has mainly applied its usual principles and
tools in doing so,79 the SEC has kept a pulse on how the internet could
and should change the securities regulation landscape. Scholars have
also hypothesized about how private issuers might leverage the power
of the internet to promote offerings under the new Rule 506(c).80 The
adjustments to securities regulation so far have been positive, but
others are necessary to address the evolving circumstances with respect
to the internet, particularly social media.81 With its knowledge
regarding how technology can impact securities markets, the SEC is
well positioned to implement changes with respect to further
developments in technology, such as targeted advertising.
II. TARGETED ADVERTISING ON SOCIAL MEDIA
AND “SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM”
While not a new practice, targeted advertising has become an
exceedingly powerful tool for companies hoping to compete in our digital
economy. Thanks to firms that aggregate and distribute consumer data,
including social media giants like Facebook, Twitter, and Google,
advertisers can reach consumers with unprecedented precision.
Further, platforms now have the capacity to not only target specific
users and provide individualized advertising content, but they can also
predict and influence future behaviors. Social media platforms assume
an important regulatory function by monitoring advertisements that
appear on their interfaces and prohibiting the advertisement of certain
financial products. This Note argues, however, that these companies do
77. Stephen M. Flanagan, No Free Speech Violation by Enforcement of Blue Sky Law, 29
FLETCHER CORP. L. ADVISER 4 (2011). Other guidance confirms this view, explaining that “the use
of an unrestricted, publicly available website constitutes a general solicitation and is not consistent
with the prohibition on general solicitation . . . if the website contains an offer of securities.” U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 38.
78. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 38.
79. See supra notes 62–74 and accompanying text (exploring how the Commission’s advice to
investors and treatment of bad actors has remained largely unchanged despite the increasing
prevalence of internet-based securities transactions and frauds).
80. See, e.g., Traeger & Easter, supra note 76, at 149–52. Scholars, including Traeger and
Easter, have also noted how the 2013 rule changes and advancements in internet technology could
impact other areas of securities regulation. See id. at 152–61. Discussion of these additional areas
is beyond the scope of this Note.
81. See id. at 161 (“To date, the SEC has not formally addressed the use of social media.”).
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not go far enough to protect users, and that the advertising practices
described here have the potential to cause a lot of harm to users-turnedinvestors. This Part examines the mechanisms that facilitate targeted
advertising on social media platforms, as well as the policies on what
advertisers can say about financial and securities products.
A. Social Media Advertising and the “Attention Extraction” Model
Targeted advertising is the practice by which companies seeking
to promote a service or product direct advertisements at certain
consumers based on characteristics those consumers possess.82
Although it has taken on new meaning in recent years, targeted
advertising is not a new concept.83 Companies and advertisers have
been targeting groups of consumers for decades, trying to discern how
habits and demographic characteristics drive purchasing preferences.84
In a sense, all advertising is “targeted” in one way or another—there
are reasons why companies choose to run certain advertisements
during Monday Night Football and others during primetime soap
operas. Social media advertising moves far beyond targeting
demographic groups expected to watch certain television programs, now
providing personalized advertisements that are more effective at
influencing behavior than ever before.
Targeting consumers through advertisements has become more
effective as platforms collect user data in greater and greater
quantities. This mass of data is known as “big data,” a term coined to
refer to the explosive increase in data produced by internet-connected
devices.85 It is called “big” data due to its “volume, velocity, and
variety.”86 One source estimates that as of 2018, ninety percent of all
the data collected throughout human history had been created in the
previous two years.87 So it is really big, and it includes everything from
posts on social media to glucose levels measured by a smart watch.88
Using this information, data collection firms extrapolate all sorts of
information.89 Browsing for motorcycles, for example, might mean that
82. Caitlin E. Jokubaitis, There and Back: Vindicating the Listener’s Interests in Targeted
Advertising in the Internet Information Economy, 42 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 85, 86–88 (2018).
83. Id. at 86.
84. Roy de Souza, A Short History of Targeted Advertising, ZEDO (May 27, 2015),
https://www.zedo.com/short-history-targeted-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/Z43P-AG3B].
85. Pickell, supra note 6.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Stuart A. Thompson, Opinion, These Ads Think They Know You, N.Y. TIMES: PRIV.
PROJECT, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/30/opinion/privacy-targeted-advertising
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a person is flagged as having a higher tolerance for risky behavior.90
This identified characteristic—tolerance for risk—then impacts what
advertisements the user is shown. And those advertisements, in turn,
impact the characteristics assigned to the user.
Social media platforms, such as Facebook, Twitter, and Google,
have interfaces that collect and distribute data about their users to
third parties.91 Advertising is how the platforms make money—for
example, ninety-eight percent of Facebook’s revenue comes from
advertising.92 Facebook has two billion users worldwide, 93 all of whom
create monetizable data with every click.94 In addition, the site provides
a platform for advertising, through which it supplies the information
about users that companies target.95 Advertisers can identify and show
advertisements to users according to their attributes, such as age and
gender, and by their location.96
The platforms have also figured out how to predict user behavior
and imperceptibly change the way users behave and think over time.97
As a user engages with a social media platform, the platform “learns”
.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/SC27-EC7Q] (“Just by browsing the web, you’re
sending valuable data to trackers and ad platforms.”); Kalev Leetaru, The Data Brokers So
Powerful Even Facebook Bought Their Data – But They Got Me Wildly Wrong, FORBES (Apr. 5,
2018, 4:08 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2018/04/05/the-data-brokers-sopowerful-even-facebook-bought-their-data-but-they-got-me-wildly-wrong/#668c3f43107a
[https://perma.cc/FA2X-CLP7].
90. Yael Grauer, What Are ‘Data Brokers,’ and Why Are They Scooping Up Information About
You?, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (Mar. 27, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/
article/bjpx3w/what-are-data-brokers-and-how-to-stop-my-private-data-collection [https://perma.
cc/7FD4-R9WT].
91. Cooper Smith, Social Big Data: The User Data Collected by Each of the World’s Largest
Social Networks – And What It Means, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 16, 2014, 11:40 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/social-big-data-the-type-of-data-collected-by-social-networks2014-1 [https://perma.cc/K7CF-UERB].
92. VICE News, All the Hidden Ways Facebook Ads Target You, YOUTUBE (Apr. 13, 2018),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EM1IM2QUYjk [https://perma.cc/5U4Y-4PZ3].
93. Id.
94. Id.; see also Devin Pickell, Social Media Data Mining – How It Works and Who’s Using It,
G2 LEARNING HUB (Apr. 12, 2019), https://learn.g2.com/social-media-data-mining [https://perma.
cc/BKC2-WG3E] (noting that “tweets, comments, [and] status updates” are the primary types of
social media data that businesses seek to mine); THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 14:03.
95. VICE News, supra note 92.
96. Id. Further, the platforms allow advertisers to connect with users through a powerful tool
called “Custom Audiences,” through which Facebook will match, for example, a list of email
addresses with users on the platform. See Intro to Custom Audiences, TWITTER: BUS.,
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/campaign-setup/campaign-targeting/custom-audiences.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DTM9-KJL2]; About Custom Audiences, GOOGLE:
SUPPORT, https://support.google.com/google-ads/answer/9805516 (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/H74W-22MK]. This allows advertisers to specify exactly which users will see a
particular advertisement; the advertisements, known as “dark posts,” are visible only to the
custom audience. VICE News, supra note 92.
97. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 14:21 (“It’s the gradual, slight, imperceptible
change in your own behavior and perception that is the product [social media companies sell].”).
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about the user, allowing it to predict what content it should provide in
the future.98 Further, social media platforms have developed features
designed to create dopamine reactions and keep users glued to their
screens. This engagement is more aptly characterized as addiction—
another objective of the platforms.99 Meanwhile, users are both
unaware of and powerless to stop this manipulation and their
worsening addiction.100
Google design ethicist turned tech watchdog Tristan Harris calls
this the “ ‘attention extraction’ business model,” wherein social media
companies “sell[ ] advertisers . . . highly sophisticated techniques to
manipulate individuals and the public sphere.”101 Importantly, the
model operates through algorithms based on machine learning. There
are no human programmers behind the screen doing the predicting—
rather, algorithms are the lifeblood of the attention extraction model.102
They are programmed to absorb and optimize every available
datapoint. This powerful model turns users’ attention, as well as their
long-term behavioral changes, into an extremely valuable product for
advertisers.103 It is central to the new reality of “surveillance
capitalism,” a system in which users are the product and market
participants trade in “human futures.”104

98. Id. at 15:00.
99. See Devika Girish, ‘The Social Dilemma’ Review: Unplug and Run, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/09/movies/the-social-dilemma-review.html
[https://
perma.cc/CJ3T-VAFC] (“[C]onscientious defectors from [big tech and social media] companies
explain that the perniciousness of social networking platforms is a feature, not a bug.”).
100. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 28:20 (“One thing [Facebook] concluded is that
we now know we can affect real-world behavior and emotions without ever triggering the user’s
awareness. They are completely clueless.”); id. at 33:16 (“Social media is a drug . . . [that has] the
potential for addiction.”).
101. Tristan Harris, EU Should Regulate Facebook and Google as ‘Attention Utilities,’ FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 1, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/abd80d98-595e-11ea-abe5-8e03987b7b20
[https://perma.cc/BG4W-8HTK]; see also THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 15:30 (describing
“surveillance capitalism”).
102. Ben Hoyle, The Silicon Valley Insider Who Says Turn Off Your Phone, TIMES (Jan. 4,
2020, 12:01 AM GMT), https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/the-silicon-valley-insider-who-saysturn-off-your-phone-rwspxt6xr [https://perma.cc/5QZP-QTVG]; see also THE SOCIAL DILEMMA,
supra note 19, at 15:00 (arguing that social media companies sell the certainty of successful
advertising, which requires “great predictions” about consumer behavior, which further requires
“a lot of data”).
103. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 14:03.
104. Id. at 15:47; see also ZUBOFF, supra note 5, at 8 (“Surveillance capitalists have grown
immensely wealthy from these trading operations, for many companies are eager to lay bets on
our future behavior.”); Noam Kolt, Return on Data: Personalizing Consumer Guidance in Data
Exchanges, 38 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 77, 78 (2019) (“Many technology companies do not charge fees
for the services they provide. They market their services as free. But these arrangements can be
misleading. The business models of Big Tech firms and other service providers rely on consumers
trading personal data for services.” (footnote omitted)).
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Before it comes time to actually show advertisements to users,
platforms review the advertisements and enforce limitations on what
advertisements can say. Facebook, Twitter, and Google all have
advertisement approval processes that screen out advertisements that
do not comply with their standards or that promote certain types of
restricted or prohibited content.105 Google and Facebook do not allow
advertisers to include information that signals to recipients they are
being targeted—for example, an advertisement that used a recipient’s
name would be prohibited.106 Twitter prohibits targeting users on the
basis of certain categories of “sensitive information,” such as “[n]egative
financial status or condition” or “[r]acial or ethnic origin.”107
Each platform also has policies concerning financial products
and services, and for the most part, they all restrict and prohibit the
same things. For example, all three platforms prohibit advertisements
that promote Initial Coin Offerings (“ICOs”) and cryptocurrency token
sales.108 They merely restrict advertisements that provide information
about cryptocurrency, such as those about “[e]vents, education and
news related to Cryptocurrency (where no cryptocurrency products or
services are on offer),” by requiring advertisers to obtain approval to

105. Advertising Policies, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads (last visited Mar.
12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/52NS-WYPN]; Twitter Ads Policies, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.
twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/55TB-LQMA];
Google Ads Policies, GOOGLE: SUPPORT, https://support.google.com/adspolicy (last visited Mar. 12,
2021) [https://perma.cc/CEZ4-CAMM].
106. Advertising
Policies:
Prohibited
Content
Personal
Attributes,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited_content/personal_attributes (last visited Mar.
12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/VKL4-ZP5S]; Data Collection and Use, GOOGLE: SUPPORT,
https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/6020956 (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc
/N77L-CFUF]; see also Thompson, supra note 89 (“[Facebook] bans most ads showing how you’ve
been targeted.”).
107. Policies for Conversion Tracking and Custom Audiences, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.
twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/campaign-considerations/policies-for-conversion-tracking-andcustom-audiences.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/L3DA-NWRH]. Interestingly,
Twitter’s policy also provides that “[a]dvertisers may not create advertisements which assert or
imply knowledge of personally identifiable or sensitive information, even when the ad has been
created and targeted without using such information.” Id.
108. Advertising Policies: Prohibited Content, Prohibited Financial Products and Services,
FACEBOOK,
https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/prohibited_content/prohibited_financial_
products_and_services (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/DW8K-U3KQ]; Advertising
Policies: Restricted Content, Cryptocurrency Products and Services, FACEBOOK, https://www.
facebook.com/policies/ads/restricted_content/cryptocurrency_products_and_services (last visited
Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/A8K7-K86M]; Financial Products and Services, TWITTER: BUS.,
https://business.twitter.com/en/help/ads-policies/ads-content-policies/financial-services.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/P6YT-U6RV]; Financial Products and Services, GOOGLE:
SUPPORT, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/2464998 (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/T65Y-DXLX].
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run such advertisements.109 Google forbids advertisements that contain
“unreliable claims” such as those related to financial products or
services that promise “large financial return with minimal risk, effort
or investment” (“ ‘[g]et rich quick’ schemes”).110 Twitter similarly
prohibits advertisements that endorse “unacceptable business
practices” like “[p]romoting misleading information or omitting
vital information on pricing, payment terms, or expenses the user
will incur.”111
B. Not Your Mother’s Targeted Advertising
Advertising platforms such as those provided by Facebook,
Twitter, and Google might seem like mere conduits for advertising, but
what they facilitate is a new, more powerful type of targeted advertising
operating within the “attention extraction” economy.112 The advertising
landscape has changed with respect to how data is collected, how
advertisements reach consumers, and how those advertisements
impact consumers.113 Instead of extrapolating about consumer
preferences from broad characteristics of certain groups of people—
users over the age of fifty, for example—companies now have access to

109. Advertising Policies: Restricted Content, Cryptocurrency Products and Services, supra
note 108; see also Financial Products and Services, supra note 108 (restricting certain
cryptocurrency information); Financial Products and Services, supra note 108 (same).
110. Misrepresentation, GOOGLE: SUPPORT, https://support.google.com/adspolicy/answer/
6020955?hl=en&ref_topic=1626336 (last visited Mar. 8 2021) [https://perma.cc/9SXM-DS35]. More
broadly, Google prohibits “[s]camming users by concealing or misstating information about the
advertiser’s business, product, or service,” such as “[e]nticing users to part with money or
information through a fictitious business that lacks the qualifications or capacity to provide the
advertised products or services.” Id.
111. Unacceptable Business Practices, TWITTER: BUS., https://business.twitter.com/en/help/
ads-policies/ads-content-policies/unacceptable-business-practices.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/WRP5-TA74]. Facebook has a comparable prohibition on advertisements that
“promote products, services, schemes or offers using deceptive or misleading practices, including
those meant to scam people out of money or personal information.” Advertising Policies: Prohibited
Content, Unacceptable Business Practices, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads/
prohibited_content/unacceptable_business_practices (last Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/RJ5H4E9Q].
112. See Harris, supra note 101 (discussing how the “attention extraction” business model
harms society); THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 30:35 (“That’s what’s changed. Social
media isn’t a tool that’s just waiting to be used. It has its own goals, and it has its own means of
pursuing them by using your psychology against you.”).
113. See Thompson, supra note 89 (“Just by browsing the web, you’re sending valuable data to
trackers and ad platforms.”); THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 15:00, 15:30 (describing
“surveillance capitalism” and the business model of social media companies that relies on
unprecedented amounts of data collected).
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user-specific data, which they can aggregate, isolate, and otherwise
manipulate in a matter of keystrokes.114
Proponents of targeted online advertising argue that there is a
significant, cognizable advantage for consumers, in addition to the
benefits that advertisers reap. Consumers, they claim, get a
personalized advertising experience, which is efficient and simply gives
people what they really want.115 This argument feels strong and logical,
especially considering just how many options consumers must sort
through when browsing the internet.116 Applying these benefits to the
private securities market, it seems true that there are individuals for
whom targeted advertisements about securities offerings might be a
good thing. But do the benefits to some outweigh the potential for harm
to others—others who are likely much more vulnerable than those who
stand to benefit?
The fact that “social media can be addictive and creepy isn’t a
revelation to anyone who uses Facebook, Twitter, Instagram and the
like.”117 But many users might be shocked to learn how sophisticated
the manipulative tactics of platforms are. Their tools are incredibly
effective at changing user perspectives over time—all to the benefit of
advertisers who provide social media companies’ primary source of
revenue.118 Because the platform learns more about users the more time
users spend scrolling, and it suggests content based on what it thinks
users like and what it wants them to engage with,119 targeted
advertising arguably does not provide consumers what they want. It
provides consumers what the platform and advertisers want consumers
to want.
These targeted advertising practices, and the surveillance
capitalism economy in which they operate, present concerns regardless
of what product is the subject of advertisement. When advertisements
concern material goods or everyday services, these practices raise
questions about privacy, consumer health, and the role social media

114. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the monetization of data by social
media companies).
115. See Protecting Consumers in the Next Tech-ade: A Report by the Staff of the Federal Trade
Commission, supra note 7, at 10–11 (describing the creation of user-specific advertising messages
by profiling the users’ online habits, which may lead to more relevant advertising for users).
116. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text (discussing “big data” and the vast amount
of information available on the internet).
117. Girish, supra note 99.
118. Id.; THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 27:56 (“It’s not like [social media companies]
are trying to benefit us. Right? We’re just zombies, and they want us to look at more ads so they
can make more money.”).
119. THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 28:20, 29:04, 29:29.
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plays in society.120 But when advertisements concern financial services
and securities, particularly private instruments, an additional layer of
risk materializes, bringing a nuanced set of securities-specific harms
along with it.121 Notably, the algorithms move user behavior slowly and
imperceptibly—for the risk tolerant consumer, perhaps the algorithms
start by showing advertisements for motorcycles, then maybe
advertisements for skydiving. Next, maybe the algorithm decides the
consumer might like to see advertisements for a casino, where the
consumer is presented with a risky money-related opportunity.
Eventually, this type of progression could lead the algorithms to present
advertisements for—and the consumer to become interested in—
private securities offerings.122
Despite their shortcomings, the advertising policies reveal a key
strength in social media companies’ approaches to targeted advertising.
The platforms appear to recognize the high risk of investor harm
associated with certain types of financial products, as well as the
platforms’ potential role in facilitating that harm.123 By prohibiting
advertisers from selling cryptocurrency on their platforms, Facebook,
Twitter, and Google assume a regulatory function in an area where the
law is still evolving.124 But these policies on cryptocurrency advertising
are likely best understood as attempts to minimize liability exposure as
the SEC and private companies battle over whether ICOs are securities

120. See generally id. (describing concerns regarding the impact of social media on society).
121. See infra notes 140–145 and accompanying text (discussing the particular risks and
harms that arise when targeted advertising and private securities offerings intersect).
122. Political radicalization occurring via social media and at the hands of these algorithms
offers a helpful analog. In essence, algorithms detect themes, like conservative principles or risktaking behavior, and extrapolate out to locate related content. See, e.g., Jonas Kaiser & Adrian
Rauchfleisch, How YouTube Helps Homogeneous Online Communities, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 23,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/how-youtube-helps-form-homogeneous-onlinecommunities/ [https://perma.cc/9XC4-9J9E]:
YouTube’s algorithms work really well at detecting shared themes and forming
communities around them. Yet these algorithmic decisions lack nuance: They cannot
distinguish between “news” on the one hand and “political punditry” on the other. And
without the ability to make nuanced determinations about content, the
algorithms sidestep questions about the veracity of the information presented and
extremist speech.
123. See supra notes 105–111 (detailing the policies of social media companies); NASAA
Expands Annual Top Investor Threat List, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2013),
https://www.nasaa.org/27012/nasaa-expands-annual-top-investor-threats-list/
[https://perma.cc/562S-PATP] (identifying “digital currency” as one of the top ten riskiest
financial products).
124. See Nikhilesh De, The SEC Just Released Its Long-Awaited Crypto Token Guidance,
COINDESK,
https://www.coindesk.com/the-sec-just-released-its-crypto-token-guidance
(last
updated Apr. 3, 2019, 11:21 AM) [https://perma.cc/FB7Q-MVLN] (discussing new guidance from
the SEC regarding whether cryptocurrencies are securities).
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offerings that must comply with federal securities laws. 125 While it is
commendable that the platforms also prohibit advertisements that are
manipulative, deceptive, and fraudulent, these prohibitions seem to add
little to the existing securities regulation framework, which also
prohibits such practices.126
Regardless of motivation, the advertisement policies discussed
above are a net positive for investor protection, adding another layer of
oversight in a high-stakes system.127 But given the wide array of
financial products and services not covered by social media advertising
policies (i.e., anything that is not crypto) and the manipulative realm in
which the advertisements exist, the potential for harm—and the
platforms’ role in it—remains.
III. HARMS OF ALLOWING TARGETED ADVERTISEMENTS
IN PRIVATE SECURITIES OFFERINGS
Since its inception, the private securities offering regime has
drawn criticism from all sides. Most relevantly for this Note, critics
point to its failure to provide sufficient investor protection in high-risk
offerings where frauds flourish. All potential issues arising with private
placements are given new meaning with the introduction of targeted
advertising on social media. At the intersection of surveillance
capitalism’s human futures market and the historically volatile private
securities market, the risks are amplified.
This Part examines longstanding criticisms of the regulatory
structure that governs private offerings, then identifies how targeted
advertising and surveillance capitalism aggravate issues related to that
structure. The potential overlap between private securities markets
and targeted advertising heightens the risk of harm not only to
investors but also to the markets, issuers, and social media companies
that play crucial roles in the system.

125. Matt Robinson & Olga Kharif, SEC Sues Kik over $100 Million ICO, Sees Kin as a
Security, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-04/sec-sues-crypto-firmthat-s-raising-money-to-fight-regulator (last updated June 4, 2019, 1:02 PM) [https://perma.
cc/TM2H-ELLT] (discussing the SEC’s lawsuit against Kik for allegedly conducting an illegal
securities offering and Kik’s efforts to raise funds to combat the SEC’s enforcement actions).
126. See Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020)
(making it unlawful to, “in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,” employ any means
to defraud, make false statements, or engage in deceitful practices).
127. See, e.g., Advertising Policies: Prohibited Content, Prohibited Financial Products
and Services, supra note 108 (explaining Facebook’s advertising policies with respect to
financial products).
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A. Risks Associated with Private Offerings
Private offerings present distinctive risks for individual
investors for a few reasons.128 First, because private offering issuers do
not have the same disclosure obligations as they would for a public
offering, investors have less information about the securities and are
not always well-positioned to judge the value of an investment.129 To
exacerbate this informational deficit, private securities offered under
Rule 506 are illiquid,130 meaning that investors could then be saddled
with volatile, unpredictable investments.131 The features that make
private securities offerings so attractive to issuers and investors alike—
relatively low levels of regulation and minimal barriers to entry—are
also what make them fertile ground for fraudulent and unfair
practices.132 To heighten concerns, fraudsters often target vulnerable
individuals and exploit investor vulnerabilities to encourage
investment in private offerings.133 Private securities provide fraudsters
128. Although institutions are also eligible to participate in private offerings, this Note focuses
on individual investors, as they are most vulnerable to the risks discussed and are the group
potentially impacted by targeted advertising on social media. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2020)
(defining an “accredited investor” to include institutions and natural persons).
129. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, supra note 123 (“While Reg D/Rule 506 offerings are used
by many legitimate companies to raise capital, they carry high risk and may not be suitable for
many individual investors.”).
130. The illiquidity of private securities comes from the fact that participation in the private
markets is restricted to certain investors, see supra Section I.A, meaning that the securities are
difficult to sell quickly simply because there is “a lack of ready and willing investors or speculators
to” buy. Christina Majaski, Illiquid, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/
i/illiquid.asp (last updated July 13, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K4LX-XTBE]. Consequently,
“illiquid [securities] tend to have lower trading volume, wider bid-ask spreads, and greater price
volatility.” Id.
131. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, supra note 123 (“By definition these are limited investment
offerings that are highly illiquid, generally lack transparency and have little regulatory
oversight.”); see also Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.
investor.gov/additional-resources/general-resources/glossary/rule-506-regulation-d (last visited
Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/V8WK-2VDU] (“Purchasers of securities offered pursuant to Rule
506 receive ‘restricted’ securities, meaning that the securities cannot be sold for at least six months
or a year without registering them.”).
132. See Ilon Oliveira, Comment, Regulation of Rule 506 Private Placements: The Teetering
Balance Between Investor Protection and Capital Formation, 45 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 287, 304
(2015) (“Furthermore, Rule 506 offerings have been ranked ‘as the most common vehicle for fraud,
as they are highly illiquid, and lack transparency and regulatory oversight.’ ”).
133. See N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS. ASS’N, supra note 123 (identifying Rule 506 private placements
as posing the highest risk of fraudulent activity); see also Investor Alert: Have Something in
Common with Someone Selling an Investment? It May Make You a Target for Fraud., U.S. SEC. &
EXCH.
COMM’N (July
15,
2019),
https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/newsalerts/investor-alerts/investor-alert-have-something-common-someone [https://perma.cc/HK2QNNZM] (warning investors to be wary of individuals who may pretend to have something in
common with them in order to convince them to invest in an unsuitable product). For example, the
SEC brings enforcement actions every year against issuers who conduct fraudulent private
offerings targeted at elderly investors who are swindled out of their savings. See, e.g., Press
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with a perfect hideaway, free from public and regulatory scrutiny but
within easy reach of large amounts of capital.
The law is most concerned about people with the least amount
of money to invest (and therefore the most to lose).134 Say an investor
purchases $150,000 in private securities, and those securities lose twothirds of their value due to a market event and the underlying volatility
of the instruments, meaning that they are eventually worth only
$50,000. While a $100,000 loss might be insignificant to a large
investment fund, it could devastate an individual investor, making the
harm of the loss greater despite bearing the same price tag.135
Conversely, the law is less worried about investors who have more
money—like the aforementioned investment fund, or even an
individual who has large amounts of personal wealth—because it
assumes they are either more sophisticated, in a better position to hire
a financial advisor, or simply more capable of tolerating significant
financial loss.136 These assumptions are directly reflected in the
existence of the accredited investor thresholds, although they, too,
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Staten Island-Based Firm with Operating Boiler
Room Scheme Targeting Seniors (Dec. 18, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2014287.html [https://perma.cc/2ZSA-W3DT] (“[Defendants] used high-pressure sales tactics to
convince seniors to invest in [private] companies purportedly on the brink of conducting initial
public offerings (IPOs).”). The SEC’s website also warns investors about “affinity fraud,” through
which fraudsters claim to belong to a particular affinity group—often a racial or ethnic minority—
in order to gain investors’ trust and get them to invest in a fraudulent scheme. SEC Spotlight:
Affinity Fraud, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/affinity-fraud.shtml (last
updated Sept. 20, 2016) [https://perma.cc/R8VQ-QVAL].
134. Jeffrey J. Hass, Small Issue Public Offerings Conducted over the Internet: Are They
“Suitable” for the Retail Investor?, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 67, 139 (1998) (discussing limitations on
issuers that could keep securities “out of the hands of the most vulnerable investors”).
135. The mere perception of this type of loss could have disastrous consequences for an
individual investor. In June 2020, 20-year-old college student Alex Kearns committed suicide after
seeing a negative balance of $730,000 on his account with Robinhood, a commission-free online
trading platform. Even more tragically, the negative balance was “only temporary and would be
corrected once the underlying stock was credited to his account.” Sergei Klebnikov & Antoine Gara,
20-Year-Old Robinhood Customer Dies by Suicide After Seeing a $730,000 Negative Balance,
FORBES (June 17, 2020, 10:55 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/06/17/20year-old-robinhood-customer-dies-by-suicide-after-seeing-a-730000-negative-balance/
[https://perma.cc/56FQ-YK5Q]. Kearns repeatedly tried to contact Robinhood about the staggering
figures on his account, but no one at the company answered him. His family has filed suit against
Robinhood for wrongful death. Matt Egan, ‘He Would Be Alive Today’: Parents Detail Son’s
Desperate Attempts to Contact Robinhood Before He Killed Himself, CNN: BUS., https://www.cnn.
com/2021/02/11/investing/robinhood-lawsuit-suicide-alex-kearns/index.html (last updated Feb. 11,
2021, 2:08 PM) [https://perma.cc/CGZ5-R3VU]. According to those who knew him, Kearns began
trading on Robinhood during the COVID-19 pandemic, and although he was an amateur investor,
he was careful about his savings and transactions. In a note he left for his family, “Kearns insisted
that he never authorized [the trading strategy at issue] and was shocked to find his small account
could rack up such an apparent loss.” Klebnikov & Gara, supra.
136. See Hass, supra note 134, at 139 (describing the merits of offerings to wealthy investors);
see also Oguss, supra note 14, at 290 (discussing the view that wealthy investors are sophisticated
and capable of protecting their interests).

6 - Claxton_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/7/2021 9:01 PM

2021] PRIVATE OFFERINGS & TARGETED ADVERTISING

1213

provide questionable levels of investor protection. 137 As one
commentator noted, however, the events of the 2008 financial crisis
“prove[d] [these] assumption[s] false.”138 That crisis demonstrates that
even wealthy and financially sophisticated individuals and institutions
can fall prey to unfair or unsound investment practices.139
B. Potential Harms of Allowing Targeted
Advertising in Private Offerings
Targeted advertising, and the internet more broadly, provide
new, powerful tools for bad actors seeking to commit securities fraud on
vulnerable populations.140 The frequency of SEC enforcement actions
related to deceitful internet activity makes clear that people are
susceptible to securities fraud over the internet.141 That risk increases
when the ability to target vulnerable individuals is added to the
equation, especially when the targeting is itself intended to facilitate
harm.142 Just as there is nothing to stop companies from targeting
motorcycle purchasers, there are relatively few barriers to stop
137. The accredited investor thresholds have long been criticized as inappropriately proxying
financial sophistication through wealth. Tiemeier, supra note 22, at 116. Additionally, the
thresholds are both over- and under-inclusive. See Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers:
A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 279, 310–11 (2000) (“The definition of an accredited
investor, for example, may treat otherwise financially sophisticated investors as nonaccredited,
while treating financial neophytes as accredited.”).
138. Oguss, supra note 14, at 288–89.
139. See Matt Levine, Opinion, You Never Want to Be Suckered This Badly, BLOOMBERG (May
17, 2018, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-05-17/securities-fraud-canhappen-with-private-transactions [https://perma.cc/B43J-YJE3]. Still, the risks associated with
private placements are less of a concern with institutional accredited investors for a number of
reasons. First, because institutions such as pension funds or large corporations have more money,
they are better shielded from loss than the average person, even if that person is fairly wealthy.
See Levine, supra note 25. Second, institutional investors have access to higher return (i.e., higher
quality) private investments that do not present the same risks as the types of private investments
individuals normally can access. Id. Finally, sophisticated institutional investors often have access
to large amounts of information about private investments through an opportunity to conduct due
diligence, which is a privilege individual investors typically do not enjoy and puts institutional
investors at an informational advantage. See id. Information is power in the world of securities,
and institutional investors therefore have exponentially more power than individuals, which
allows them to make better decisions about their investments. See supra notes 9–10
and accompanying text (discussing the view that information is power in the world of
securities investments).
140. See Girish, supra note 99 (discussing the manipulative capacity of social media); cf.
Unger, supra note 57 (discussing of the impact of the internet on raising capital).
141. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text (discussing enforcement actions involving
internet-based securities fraud).
142. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how issuers may target individuals
from certain groups for participation in private offerings due to perceived vulnerability of those
individuals); see also THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19 (explaining that social media companies
have developed techniques by which they can target individual users to provide unique content
designed to change that user’s behavior and thinking over time).
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fraudsters from using advertisements for fraudulent securities
offerings to target apparently vulnerable (and possibly gullible)
individuals.143 Additionally, with the ability to provide content designed
to influence consumer behavior, users may not realize that the platform
has nudged them toward viewing and responding to such
advertisements—moving from motorcycles to securities gradually over
time.144 In doing so, the algorithm has functioned exactly as it was
designed to.145
The Commission has explicitly acknowledged the risks
presented to investors by social media.146 It maintains guidance for
investors on how to protect themselves from securities fraud conducted
over social media, and it counsels investors to remain wary of
investment opportunities presented online. 147 It stands to reason,
though, that the investor who knows to seek this guidance from the SEC
about online investments is probably not the type of investor the law
needs to worry about. Research indicates that Americans, including
those who invest in securities, are not very financially literate
overall.148 Among the most consistently financially illiterate groups are
the elderly and particular minorities.149 These populations are
frequently targeted for “affinity fraud” schemes, perhaps because of this
perceived financial illiteracy.150
Platforms’ existing rules for targeted advertising do offer some
protection to users. For example, Facebook requires that
advertisements actually lead to real landing pages when clicked,
preventing the possibility that a user might click on an advertisement
expecting one thing but finding something else, perhaps something
unsavory.151 Information about this landing page rule is available for
anyone to find, including fraudsters. So, someone hoping to advertise a
143. Cf. supra notes 105–111 and accompanying text (discussing policies that limit what
advertisers can include in content disseminated on social media platforms).
144. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing political radicalization resulting
from social media algorithms).
145. See supra notes 112–119 and accompanying text (discussing the manipulative aims of
social media content curation and advertising).
146. See supra Section I.C (discussing the Commission’s acknowledgement of the dangers
posed by the internet).
147. Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc., supra note 62.
148. Lisa M. Fairfax, The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy, 104 VA. L. REV.
1065, 1077, 1082–83 (2018).
149. Id. at 1081.
150. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing how securities fraudsters often
target the elderly and members of certain affinity groups).
151. In other words, this policy requires that when users click an advertisement, the page they
land on is (pun intended) as-advertised and fully functional. See Advertising Policies: The Ad
Review Process, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policies/ads (last visited Mar. 12, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/52NS-WYPN].
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fraudulent offering on Facebook—and who is sophisticated enough to
perpetrate securities fraud—presumably would make sure their
advertisements match the landing page. The platforms also prohibit the
advertisement of certain instruments,152 but this prohibition falls far
short of covering all options for bad actors seeking to sell fraudulent
securities. The nail in the platforms’ coffin, of course, is that their
algorithms operate autonomously to curate content intended to
influence user behavior, so even well-designed and well-intended
protection mechanisms like those discussed above cannot stop
manipulation in a system that is designed to manipulate.153
In addition to a concern over abuse of these platforms and their
data, there is also a possibility that honest users of consumer data may
inadvertently target the wrong types of individuals. 154 Data collected by
a social media platform may be limited, and the platform may also
share only select data with advertisers, often due to privacy agreements
the platform has with users.155 More concerning, though, is the
possibility that an algorithm might lead a user to engage with
advertisements for private offerings, without knowing that the user is
not an accredited investor.156 Again, the algorithm here is functioning
as its programmers intend it to, capitalizing on data to influence the
user to the benefit of advertisers who spend money on the platform.157
These limitations on the utility of social media data could lead issuers
to misidentify people who appear to be accredited based on certain
behaviors but in fact do not meet the accredited investor thresholds.
Notwithstanding consequences for the system overall, targeted
advertising of private securities has the potential to negatively impact
aspects of and particular groups within that system. In addition to
152. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text (discussing the algorithms that run
social media platforms).
154. See Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J.
235, 274 (2019) (“First, the proper workings of algorithms depend on the input of clear, correct,
and codable data. When algorithms access informational sources (like alternative data) that are
ambiguous, falsified, or overly noisy, their output will be tainted by error and thus unreliable.”).
155. Alexandra Olteanu, Carlos Castillo, Fernado Diaz & Emre Kiciman, Social Data: Biases,
Methodological Pitfalls, and Ethical Boundaries, FRONTIERS BIG DATA, July 11, 2019, at 1, 13,
https://doi.org/10.3389/fdata.2019.00013 [https://perma.cc/BG9K-M4CB] (pdf download available
at URL provided). Furthermore, advertisers can extrapolate only so much from certain types of
data—for example, Oletanu et al., supra, observe that sometimes advertisers know what users
“Like” and what users write, but not what they read. Additionally, using different types of data to
answer the same questions (i.e., is this user likely to click on our advertisement based on past
activity) can yield different answers.
156. See THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19 (explaining that algorithms collect and analyze
data about social media users in order to predict what content it believes the user would like to
engage with).
157. See id. (indicating that social media companies use algorithms to influence user behavior).
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somewhat obvious risks to investors, allowing targeted advertising for
private securities offerings will ultimately harm our markets and even
the issuers themselves. Social media companies face mounting criticism
and scrutiny over advertising practices, among other features, and they
risk huge losses depending on how lawmakers decide to regulate them.
These harms and risks, though they can be categorized according to who
and what they impact, are also interconnected in important ways.
1. Harm to Investors
Investors face harm from targeted advertising in obvious and
acute ways, most of which this Note has already discussed. The crux of
these risks and harms can be distilled down to this: targeted advertising
exacerbates the preexisting asymmetries between investors and issuers
in private offerings. The information gap between issuers and investors
becomes an information crevasse, where issuers can locate investors
based on the most intimate types of data and influence investors’
thinking about securities investments. Investors may not even realize
what is happening nor have any power to change the dynamic. Indeed,
an investor may be targeted precisely because she is not financially
literate and also not averse to risky behavior. But there is a difference
between taking a risk like riding motorcycles and taking a risk in
purchasing private securities. A motorcycle will likely not deplete
or steal your life savings, but a private securities investment gone
wrong might.
When the private offerings turn out to be a bad investment—or
worse, fraudulent—investors are stuck with ex post remedies that do
not account for the increased ex ante risk. If there have been violations
of the securities laws, the SEC can bring an enforcement action, or
investors can sue privately to recover lost funds. But full recovery may
be impossible since the issuer may not be solvent, especially in the case
of fraud. If the offering was legitimate, the investor is out of luck, and
she will simply have to deal with the loss. Over time, investors may
become disillusioned with securities investing and choose to keep
their money elsewhere, resulting in harm to our markets and
issuers themselves.
2. Harm to Markets and Issuers
The U.S. financial markets are built on public trust—trust in
government, trust in financial institutions, and trust in the American
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way.158 When these structures falter, “loss of public trust can quickly
reverberate throughout the economy.”159 If people no longer trust that
the financial markets will do right by them and their money, they may
choose not to invest their money at all, instead leaving it in savings
accounts where it is safe from market volatility and greedy financial
professionals. In turn, the market suffers further, as do the issuers
and firms “whose lifeblood is the continued public trust in our
securities markets.”160
This is not a new idea—indeed, it spurred the creation of the
modern U.S. securities regulation regime following the Great
Depression.161 With the addition of targeted advertising, a loss of trust
would likely have far-reaching effects. An event causing this type of loss
of public confidence would occur at the intersection of two major facets
of modern American life: financial markets and the internet. As such,
the “reverberation” of the loss could be expected to ripple out even
further than would a purely financial market-based loss.162
C. Where Does This Leave Social Media and Big Tech?
Social media and Big Tech companies stand to lose a lot in a
potential targeted advertising/private offering fallout. Americans are
already concerned about the lack of control they have over collection of
158. See ARTHUR W. PAGE SOC’Y & BUS. ROUNDTABLE I NST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, THE DYNAMICS
PUBLIC TRUST IN BUSINESS: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FOR LEADERS 14 (2009),
https://knowledge.page.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Full_Report-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6C7
-BMJ3] (arguing that trust in business “is what enables economic efficiency and prosperity on both
the scale of a small, family-owned restaurant and the macroeconomic scale of the free market”).
159. CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, SELF-REGULATION IN TODAY’S SECURITIES
MARKETS: OUTDATED SYSTEM OR WORK IN PROGRESS? 22 (2007), https://www.cfainstitute.org//media/documents/article/position-paper/self-regulation-in-todays-securities-markets-outdatedsystem-or-work-in-progress.ashx [https://perma.cc/B58G-E3YZ]. Recent examples of this
phenomenon include the Enron scandal and the 2008 Financial Crisis. See ARTHUR W. PAGE SOC’Y
& BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, supra note 158, at 19 (noting a “lack of concern about
public trust among the investment community as the Enron-era business scandals became more
remote,” which changed quickly in the wake of the 2008 Financial Crisis as “governments around
the globe [intervened] in financial markets on an unprecedented scale in the name of restoring
investor confidence and public trust, which are widely recognized as vital to economic recovery”).
160. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 15 (1988) (discussing proposed legislation to curb insider
trading and the havoc it wreaks on the financial markets).
161. See ARTHUR W. PAGE SOC’Y & BUS. ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORP. ETHICS, supra note 158,
at 15 (“[G]overnment has stepped in to protect the public interest by regulating corporate activity
in response to a perceived imbalance of power between corporations and the public. . . . During the
Great Depression, Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal focused first on financial services . . . [with the]
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 . . . .”); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing
the context of the passage of the Securities Act of 1933).
162. See CFA INST. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, supra note 159, at 22; cf. Brummer &
Yadav, supra note 154, at 278 (“[K]ey features of fintech combine to create novel risks to market
integrity: the potential for damage is uniquely difficult to measure.”).
OF
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their data; privacy feels like a rare commodity in the age of surveillance
capitalism.163 Governments are increasingly wary of these platforms’
ability to self-police and protect consumers, and formal regulation is all
but inevitable.164 Platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and Google have a
great interest in complying with federal securities laws, as well as in
making sure that public confidence in their companies erodes no
further.165 But their business models are dependent on the revenue
streams from the very advertising that threatens harm, necessitating a
change of some kind—and surely, these companies would rather change
from within than roll the dice on whatever restrictions regulators
eventually impose.166
IV. MINDING THE GAP: AN EX-ANTE SOLUTION TO A GROWING PROBLEM
In light of the original purposes of the general solicitations ban,
as well as the attitude of Congress and the Commission regarding
subsequent changes to the regulatory scheme, targeted advertisements
should not be considered general solicitations under the federal
securities laws.167 Yet targeted advertisements should not be
considered something opposite of a general solicitation, either, because
of the even larger information asymmetry between targeted
advertisement senders (issuers) and recipients (investors). Instead, this
Note suggests that targeted advertising—and the unique challenges it
poses—should be regulated in a new, distinct category. To install
protections robust enough to address these challenges, the Commission
163. See Lee Rainie, Americans’ Complicated Feelings About Social Media in an Era of Privacy
Concerns, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/03/27/americans-complicated-feelings-about-social-media-in-an-era-of-privacyconcerns/ [https://perma.cc/8XUA-N9MQ] (providing survey results indicating that Americans feel
they have lost control over how their personal information is used in the era of social media).
164. In the last year, social media companies have faced scrutiny from many angles, drawing
the attention of antitrust regulators and Congress. See, e.g., Tony Romm, Facebook, Twitter Could
Face Punishing Regulation for Their Role in U.S. Capitol Riot, Democrats Say, WASH. POST (Jan.
8, 2021, 11:51 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/08/facebook-twittercongress-trump-riot/ [https://perma.cc/9DB4-MY6Z] (discussing congressional anger at the role of
social media companies in the Capitol riot of January 2021).
165. It is true that social media companies seem to be waking up to a need to take firmer
responsibility for harms generated by their platforms, as demonstrated by the actions taken by
Facebook, Google, and Twitter following the Capitol riot of January 6, 2021. See id. (noting that
these companies took varying degrees of corrective action against President Trump and to remove
content spreading right-wing conspiracy theories from their platforms). Many say this
action comes too little, too late with respect to the events that unfolded following the 2020
presidential election. Id.
166. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 101 (proposing that social media platforms should be
regulated as public utilities).
167. See discussion supra Sections I.A, I.B (discussing general solicitations under
federal securities law).
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should impose a prohibition on using targeted advertisements over
social media to promote private offerings.
A. Targeted Advertising Does Not Fit into
the Current General Solicitations Framework
On a basic level, the use of targeted advertising for securities
feels odd, as does offering securities via social media networks. At least
part of the reason for that feeling is that securities are not like other
products for sale in today’s economy, like an article of clothing or the
latest iPhone. With most material goods, we know almost immediately
whether our purchase was a good one, simply based on our subjective
evaluation of the item. 168 With securities, however, it may take days,
months, or even longer to figure out whether the investment is sound
(i.e., whether it makes or loses money). Furthermore, the soundness of
a securities investment depends in part on actions taken after purchase
by another person or entity,169 whereas material goods remain valuable
based on factors such as their utility or sentimental value.
Targeted advertising provides issuers with the power to locate
and powerfully influence specific individuals over social media,
including those who appear less averse to engaging in risky behavior
(such as people who browse for motorcycles) and who issuers may
believe are more likely to participate in a private securities offering. An
investor may be understandably enticed into a private offering that
promises high returns despite a high risk of loss—she keeps seeing the
same advertisements for the offering on her social media page and
eventually decides to check it out. In addition to mapping directly onto
theories of human psychology and behavior,170 this all happens within
168. Defects in the product aside, of course, such as a hole in an article of clothing or a bug in
the latest iPhone. Economists describe the discovery of such value-reducing information as the
“lemon” problem. George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970).
169. This feature is indeed part of what makes something a security. See SEC v. W.J. Howey
Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946) (explaining that an investment contract, which is a security
within the meaning of the 1933 Act, “means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party”). More broadly, a security is simply “[a]n investment instrument such
as a stock or bond.” Introduction to Investing Glossary: Security, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/security (last visited
Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/KW4D-62TT].
170. Due to a phenomenon called the “mere-exposure effect,” a user may become increasingly
comfortable with the platform and the content it shows her over time—she may even become
increasingly comfortable with the private offering advertisement itself. See Mere-Exposure Effect,
APA DICTIONARY OF PSYCH., https://dictionary.apa.org/mere-exposure-effect (last visited Mar. 12,
2020) [https://perma.cc/B654-KCC2]. The American Psychological Association defines the mereexposure effect as “the finding that individuals show an increased preference (or liking) for a
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the bounds of the current law. The issuer who disseminated the
advertisement has done nothing wrong, since the advertisement was
targeted at the investor and thus is not a “general” solicitation.171
Furthermore, the issuer in this scenario has used the platform as its
creators intended, leveraging the great power of the human futures
market within the surveillance capitalism system. 172
Because the law currently does not contemplate how targeted
advertisements fit within the existing framework, there is an opening
to argue that they do not constitute the type of general solicitations
prohibited by Rule 502(c) and in offerings conducted under Rule
506(b)173 (but permissible under Rule 506(c)).174 The nomenclature
suggests as much: a “targeted” advertisement is by nature not
“general.” Targeted advertisements also function differently from
general solicitations; in theory, an issuer seeking to advertise an
offering on social media could target users that she believes are
accredited investors. But given the historical underpinnings of the Rule
506 framework—particularly how it regulates issuer communication
with investors—targeted advertisements cannot be considered a foil to
general solicitation.
Despite what its name suggests, targeted advertising looks
nothing like the preexisting relationship contemplated by the general
solicitation framework. Issuers seeking to deploy targeted
advertisements have no closer a relationship to potential investors than
investors who might see advertisements on television or hear one on the
radio—which, under the current Rule 502(c), are prohibited as general
stimulus as a consequence of repeated exposure to that stimulus.” Id. Interestingly, this effect
“tends to be strongest when the person is not consciously aware of the stimulus presentations.” Id.
171. Recall that under Rule 506(b), issuers can offer securities to thirty-five nonaccredited
investors, upon only a “reasonable” belief that no more than thirty-five of these investors are
participating in the offering. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(i) (2020). Such nonaccredited investors must
possess or have access to the “knowledge and experience in financial and business matters [such]
that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.” Id.
§ 230.506(b)(2)(ii). Again, the issuer must possess only a reasonable belief about whether
nonaccredited investors meet this threshold. Id.
172. See THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 15:47 (describing the “human futures”
market that arises from the data collected from social media users); cf. Girish, supra note 99
(explaining that in The Social Dilemma, “Roger McNamee, an early investor in Facebook, delivers
a chilling allegation: Russia didn’t hack Facebook; it simply used the platform” to influence the
2016 election).
173. Informational material from the law firm Morrison & Foerster suggests that others have
already contemplated this idea. In a document called “Practice Pointers on Navigating the
Securities Act’s Prohibition on General Solicitation and General Advertising,” attorney Ze’-ev
Eiger defines general solicitations as being “communications that are not targeted or directed to a
specific individual or to a particular audience.” Eiger, supra note 40, at 1 (emphasis added).
174. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)(2)(i)-(ii) (providing that issuers may conduct private securities
offerings with the use of general solicitations so long as all purchasers are accredited investors and
the issuer takes reasonable steps to verify the accreditation status of all purchasers).
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solicitations in
certain
offerings.175
Functionally, targeted
advertisements are no different than traditional advertisements in the
sense that they facilitate a connection between a seller and a consumer
who would not otherwise be connected. In this regard, the ability to
target specific individuals should make no difference in how the law
views these types of advertisements. On the other hand, the continually
expanding informational deficit between targeted advertisers and
targeted advertisees suggests that the law should view targeted
advertisements with even greater skepticism.
A social media platform—like Facebook, Twitter, or Google—
would likely qualify as a public website in the Commission’s view,
despite the fact that users must log in with a password.176 Recall the
IPONET matter discussed above.177 Key in the Commission’s
determination that the issuer there did not engage in general
solicitations was the fact that only previously verified investors could
access the webpage containing information about offerings.178 By
contrast, anyone is free to create accounts on social media platforms,
which then gives them access to all the information on the platforms—
including any advertisements.179 Further, when potential investors in
IPONET first accessed the online survey, they were presumably aware
first, that the website was administered by an issuer of securities, and
second, that they were providing information in order to have an
opportunity to potentially purchase those securities. 180 When someone
creates a Twitter account, she merely expects to “[j]oin the public
conversation on Twitter.”181 Maybe it crosses her mind that she will
receive advertisements while on the platform, but the content of those
advertisements is likely not what drew her to the site in the
first place.182
175. Id. § 230.502.
176. Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the Commission’s guidance
regarding features of a website that impact the nature of offerings, including whether investors
need a password to access information).
177. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
178. Eiger, supra note 40, at 5; supra note 76 and accompanying text (noting that password
protection played a key role in determining that IPONET had not engaged in general solicitation);
see also Traeger & Easter, supra note 76, at 150 (“[F]unds and intermediaries involved in their
offerings have been providing information about private offerings for some time via password
protected websites that enabled only qualified investors to view the offerings . . . .”).
179. See, e.g., Signing up with Twitter, TWITTER: HELP CTR., https://help.twitter.com/en/usingtwitter/create-twitter-account (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/G2KD-5RJE].
180. See Eiger, supra note 40, at 5 (noting that individuals were invited to fill out a
questionnaire on the website of a registered broker-dealer).
181. Signing up with Twitter, supra note 179.
182. The ability to browse for and locate new products may become a primary motivation for
using the platform, though, as discussed infra. See infra notes 184–185 and accompanying text
(indicating that users may join social media to research products to buy).
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Despite certain benefits of lifting the general solicitations ban,183
the Commission made the change without adequate consideration of the
modern advertising environment—namely, the role that targeted
advertising plays. The Commission cannot be faulted for failing to
predict exactly how big and bad targeted advertising would become in
the years following the 2013 rule update. But with the benefit of
hindsight, the Commission must now reevaluate how the meaning of
“general solicitation or advertisement” has changed (and continues to
change) in light of current targeted advertising practices.
B. Targeted Advertising Should Be Regulated as a
New Category and Prohibited in Private Offerings
The continued rise of social media platforms is an important
feature of the current advertising landscape. The average internet user
spends nearly two and a half hours per day on social media, up from
roughly one and a half hours per day in 2012.184 That means that since
the Commission lifted the general solicitations ban in 2013, social
media use has increased by two thirds. Research also indicates that
around one in three users “cite researching products to buy as a main
reason for using social media.”185 In other words, consumers expect to
be able to research and purchase goods via social media networks, and
companies are meeting this demand.
Using Facebook Marketplace to buy a new motorcycle is
different than using it to purchase private securities—if the motorcycle
turns out to be a lemon, it still retains some value because it is a
physical item with a value that generally does not fluctuate, even if the
true value of the motorcycle is lower than the buyer initially thought.186
If the motorcycle has severe mechanical issues or otherwise does not
work as expected, these issues may be covered by insurance and are, at
a minimum, fixable. Put differently, there is a safety net. The same
cannot be said of illiquid, volatile private securities whose value is tied
183. See supra notes 52–53 and accompanying text (noting that lifting the ban lowered costs
for issuers and facilitated market entry for smaller issuers).
184. See Marie Ennis-O’Connor, How Much Time Do People Spend on Social Media in 2019?
[Infographic], MEDIUM (Aug. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/@JBBC/how-much-time-do-peoplespend-on-social-media-in-2019-infographic-cc02c63bede8 [https://perma.cc/6D2U-KSWH].
185. MTS Staff Writer, Doomscrolling on Social Media Platforms Through the Infodemic”,
MARTECH SERIES (July 29, 2020), https://martechseries.com/social/social-media-platforms/
doomscrolling-social-media-platforms-infodemic/ [https://perma.cc/LZ49-4EDQ]; see also EnnisO’Connor, supra note 184; GLOBALWEBINDEX, SOCIAL: GLOBALWEBINDEX’S FLAGSHIP REPORT ON
THE LATEST TRENDS IN SOCIAL MEDIA 10 (2020), https://www.globalwebindex.com/reports/social
[https://perma.cc/TLC2-4S9E].
186. For an in-depth discussion of the “lemon” problem, see Akerlof, supra note 168, at
489–90.

6 - Claxton_PAGE.docx (Do Not Delete)

6/7/2021 9:01 PM

2021] PRIVATE OFFERINGS & TARGETED ADVERTISING

1223

to market information that investors often do not have 187—value that
often cannot be recovered once lost.188
Targeted advertising should not be allowed at all in private
offerings—not even for offerings conducted under Rule 506(c), where
issuers are permitted to use general solicitations—due to the
fundamental differences between traditional and targeted advertising.
In light of evolving circumstances, the securities regulation framework
must also evolve in order to continue providing adequate protection to
investors. This Note proposes that the best way to address the risks and
potential harms involved is to prohibit social media targeted
advertising for private securities altogether, primarily because of the
difficulty and probable inadequacy of formulating a middle-ground rule.
1. Ex Ante Clarity Benefits Issuers, Social Media Networks,
the SEC, and—Most Importantly—Investors
All legal and regulatory regimes attempt to balance ex ante and
ex post remedies based on the upsides and downsides of protecting
against harm or correcting it after the fact. The securities regulation
framework in particular balances the desire to facilitate capital
formation and market growth against protecting investors, often
sacrificing one at the expense of the other.189 The ex ante/ex post
balance is delicate in securities regulation: too much ex ante regulation
and protection for investors could stifle market and issuer prosperity,
while too much reliance on ex post remedies could inadequately protect
investors and kick in only when it is too little, too late.190
Such a balance, and the difficulty of achieving it, provides the
background for regulating in this space,191 and it drives the need for a
clear, ex ante rule—here, a prohibition on using targeted
advertisements through social media to attract investors for private

187. See DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, BROOKINGS INST., MARKET LIQUIDITY: A PRIMER 3–4 (2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Market-Liquidity.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6CFA-384Z] (providing an overview of market liquidity and explaining how it can
increase price volatility, thereby increasing risk to investors).
188. See supra Section III.B.1 (discussing traditional ex-post remedies available to investors).
189. See supra Sections I.A, I.B (discussing private offerings exemptions and the ban on
general solicitations).
190. See, e.g., Brian Galle, In Praise of Ex Ante Regulation, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1715 (2015).
191. Professors Brummer and Yadav’s theory of the fintech “trilemma” illustrates this
background well. In crafting regulations on financial technology that “(i) provide clear rules, (ii)
maintain market integrity, and (iii) encourage financial innovation, regulators can achieve, at
best, two out of these three objectives,” they argue. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 154, at 242.
Regulation that provides clear rules and promotes market integrity will inevitably stifle
innovation, but regulation that prioritizes innovation will either come at the expense of rule clarity
or market security. Id.
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securities offerings. Crafting a middle-ground rule, while hypothetically
attractive, will be ineffective to remediate harms in this arena. A poorly
formulated, imprecise rule would negatively impact legitimate issuers
by not providing clear guidance on what is and is not permissible, while
benefitting deceitful issuers hoping to leverage gray areas of the law.
On the other hand, providing a clear, categorical bar is helpful for
issuers who want to know what is and is not allowed, as well as social
media networks that must police targeted advertising on their
platforms. An outright prohibition also protects investors from fraud
and subsequent losses that they may not have the financial fortitude to
withstand—and potential losses from legitimate but risky offerings.192
In other words, a prohibition provides ex ante simplicity and protection
that matches the challenges posed.
Prohibiting targeting social media users for participation in
private securities offerings addresses the major issues with the
practice, including in instances where legitimate and rule-abiding
issuers might seek to use targeted advertising on social media. First, it
removes the possibility that algorithms (or humans) incorrectly
interpret data such that investors who are not in fact accredited
inadvertently receive these advertisements.193 Second, it ensures that
if an investor participates in a private offering, the participation does
not begin with an advertisement she sees on Facebook, provided to her
by an algorithm that predicts and influences her behavior. Instead, it
encourages independent desire for and research into investments that
present a high risk of loss, which furthers the information-gathering
goals of the securities regulation regime and Regulation D. Completely
prohibiting the practice is perhaps most impactful in combatting fraud,
as such a change in the law will require social media companies to
adjust their policies accordingly and thus greatly reduce the chance that
this type of fraud will occur on their platforms.
A natural counterargument to this type of regulatory change is
that it will further stifle access to capital for firms that already have
192. See supra notes 128–137 and accompanying text (framing the impact of financial loss as
proportional to the loser’s level of wealth).
193. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2020) (providing the definition of an “accredited investor”); see
also Harris, supra note 101 (explaining that social media companies employ algorithms that
analyze user activity to determine what content to show the user in the future). There is evidence
that these types of algorithms incorrectly extrapolate user preferences with relative frequency. For
example, a Forbes journalist discovered that one algorithm had, based on his browsing practices,
determined that he is a young, single parent but also a “golden grandparent,” and that he shops
for baby products, women’s clothing and cosmetics, and retirement services. Leetaru, supra note
89. One study estimates that with accuracy at 42%, “digital audiences for gender are, on average,
less often correct than random guessing.” Nico Neuman, Catherine E. Tucker & Timothy Whitfield,
Frontiers: How Effective Is Third-Party Consumer Profiling? Evidence from Field Studies, 38
MKTG. SCI. 918, 924 (2019).
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trouble raising money. After all, the point of having exemptions under
Regulation D is to facilitate capital formation.194 While these types of
concerns are legitimate, there are two reasons why they do not
overcome the need to regulate. First, legitimate issuers who want to
take advantage of targeted advertising could still do so, just not on
social media platforms. Second, investor protection remains a primary
goal of the SEC,195 and the immense risks presented outweigh
the downside of what would likely be only a slight curbing effect on
capital formation.196
In addition, more relaxed alternatives—for example, requiring
companies that use targeted advertising to disclose this information—
suffer from the same pitfalls as allowing the practice in the first
instance. First, it stands to reason that an investor who knows to seek
out these types of disclosures is likely sophisticated enough to
participate in private offerings and not the type of investor the law
worries about. Second, by the time an investor is made aware of the
targeted advertising practices, it is likely too late, because she will
have already seen an advertisement that invites her to participate in
the offering.
2. Implementation: Seeking Clarity and Adaptability
Given the rapidly changing nature of targeted advertising and
social media use, in addition to the numerous and often conflicting
interests of the stakeholders involved, the Commission might consider
beginning by providing guidance on using social media targeted
advertising to promote private securities offerings.197 This guidance
should highlight the differences between the traditional understanding
of general solicitations and targeted advertisements, in addition to
announcing skepticism about allowing targeted advertisements for
private securities offerings in general. Starting with guidance before
undertaking full rulemaking allows the Commission to gather

194. See supra Part I (explaining that the main goal of providing exemptions under Rule
506 and Regulation D is to provide businesses with a cost-effective alternative to publicly
offered securities).
195. See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html
(last updated Dec. 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/G6U9-V3U6] (describing protecting investors as the
mission of the Commission).
196. See supra Section III.A (describing the general risks associated with private offerings).
197. See Mary Whisner, Some Guidance About Federal Agencies and Guidance, 105 LAW LIBR.
J. 385, 391–93 (2013) (discussing various forms of and uses for administrative guidance); Brummer
& Yadav, supra note 154, at 283–84 (explaining potential forms and merits of informal guidance
in the context of securities regulation).
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information before proposing any rule changes.198 It gives the
Commission an opportunity to initiate talks with the various
stakeholders without the pressure of a formal rulemaking, especially
the social media companies who would be required to adjust their
policies to accommodate a change in the law.199 Then, in the notice and
comment process that accompanies rulemaking, the Commission can
continue to solicit information and perspectives from the public.200
A change to the regulations governing private offerings should
come in the form of adding language to Rule 502, which provides
“conditions [that] shall be applicable to offers and sales under
Regulation D,” including general solicitation and advertising rules.201
Specifically, the language governing manner of offering in Rule 502(c)
should be changed to provide a prohibition on targeted advertising, in
addition to its prohibition on general solicitations. 202 For example,
502(c) could be adjusted to include language such as (with the strikethrough language to be removed and the bolded language to be added):
(c) Limitation on manner of offering. Except as provided in § 230.504(b)(1) or § 230.506(c),
Neither the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf shall offer or sell the securities by
any form of general solicitation or general advertising, including, but not limited to,
the following:
(1) Any advertisement, article, notice or other communication published in any
newspaper, magazine, or similar media or broadcast over television or radio, except
as provided in § 230.504(b)(1) or § 230.506(c); and

198. Nicholas R. Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study
of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J. ON REGUL. 165, 246 (2019) (“[I]t is surely an important
exercise of power when the agency opts to enshrine one means of compliance in a guidance
document rather than another means, since the various means on the menu may have different
costs and benefits for different stakeholders.”). As with guidance from any other agency, the
Commission’s guidance is not legally binding. See Stephan Hylas, Note, Final Agency Action in the
Administrative Procedure Act, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1644, 1652 (2017) (explaining that agency
guidance does not carry the force of law). There is evidence, however, that actors are generally
compliant with guidance the SEC provides, as demonstrated by the industry’s tendency to “regard
[no-action letters] as illuminating how the SEC will act upon its enforcement authority, and they
respond accordingly.” Id.; see also Parrillo, supra, at 184–218 (discussing numerous incentives
regulated parties have to follow agency guidance).
199. Cf. Brummer & Yadav, supra note 154, at 283 (“Such [informal guidance]
enables . . . firms to better innovate, insofar as they are able to better recognize what kind of
regulatory burden they might face.”).
200. See Whisner, supra note 197, at 391 (“When agencies adopt rules, they must publish
a notice of proposed rule making and give interested parties an opportunity to comment.”
(footnote omitted)).
201. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2020).
202. Id. § 230.502(c). Slight adjustments to other parts of the rule—namely, 504(b)(1) and
506(c), which are exempt from compliance with Rule 502(c)—will be necessary to ensure that
targeted advertising is not permitted in any private offering conducted under Regulation D.
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(2) Any advertisement disseminated on a social media platform, network, or
other similar website in such a way that targets a specific individual or
group of individuals using data unique to that individual or group
of individuals.203

This proposal is not intended to function as a reinstatement of
the ban on general solicitation. As discussed above, all advertising is
“targeted” in some respects, but the proposal seeks only to regulate one
powerful type of advertising that has emerged in the last several
decades. Further, such a particularized prohibition would not come
close to covering all targeted advertising that takes place on the
internet. Instead, the proposal seeks the assistance of powerful private
actors—social media companies—that control an enormous segment of
the targeted advertising market to implement changes that will curb
specific harms occurring in a uniquely harmful environment.
Importantly, the proposed rule change would allow the Commission to
continue using its traditional enforcement mechanisms, and by
considering how modern targeted advertising interacts with the goals
of the private securities regulation regime, the proposal also accounts
for the idea that “[t]he fundamental principles of securities regulation
do not change based on the medium.”204
Because technology in general, and social media and targeted
advertising in particular, continue to evolve faster than the law, truly
effective solutions will pull in actors from both the public and private
sectors to craft flexible approaches.205 In addition to the fact that
traditional regulatory and legal schemes cannot keep pace with
technological changes,206 they do not adequately reflect the realities of
modern society, where companies like Google, Twitter, and Facebook

203. See id. (providing the original text) Such a change to the rules can, of course, be further
clarified in interpretive releases and guidance, as the Commission did with its guidance on using
public websites for private offerings. Supra Section I.C.
204. See INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 65, at 1; see also notes 68–69 and
accompanying text (noting that internet-based securities violations are addressed through the
normal enforcement and regulatory channels).
205. See Gary E. Marchant, Governance of Emerging Technologies as a Wicked Problem, 73
VAND. L. REV. 1861, 1877 (2020). In framing the regulation of rapidly evolving technology as a
“wicked problem,” Marchant calls for the combination of solutions that have historically been
treated as mutually exclusive. “Traditional government regulation will not work, at least by itself,
due to the pacing problem, the diversity of applications and stakeholders, and the complexity
created by unprecedented uncertainties and concerns,” he argues. Id. These ideas are salient here,
as regulators work to address issues identified here by leveraging the strength of the various
actors involved.
206. Traeger & Easter, supra note 76, at 161.
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occupy an important part of American life. Not only would it be wise to
leverage the immense power of these companies, which already perform
certain regulatory functions, but a solution that does not involve them
as partners will never be fully adequate.
This is not to say that social media companies should be expected
or trusted to police these issues alone. Relying on the platforms to selfregulate here simply does not account for the economic realities these
platforms face.207 Specifically, the issues highlighted in this Note arise
within an ever-expanding, multibillion-dollar online advertising
industry.208 Social media platforms have great incentives to chase
profits, which almost exclusively come from advertising, but they also
have great incentives to comply with the federal securities laws. Given
the power these companies enjoy, however, they should be expected to
assist in the solution.
CONCLUSION
Investor protection is a main objective of the Commission.209 By
protecting investors from fraudulent and unfair investment practices,
the Commission arguably works toward its other goals—facilitating
capital formation and maintaining orderly, efficient markets. 210 If
investors have confidence in their investments, issuers continue to raise
capital, and markets remain stable. Threats to investor protection
therefore threaten our markets, so they should be scrutinized carefully
and eradicated where appropriate. Targeted advertisements within
social media’s attention extraction model present one such threat,
heightening preexisting risks beyond what the securities regulation
regime should allow. The age of surveillance capitalism has only just
begun, and now is the time to address the issues it creates. This Note
highlights only a small set of potential issues within much larger

207. See THE SOCIAL DILEMMA, supra note 19, at 14:21 (discussing the “product” social media
companies offer to advertisers as measurable changes in consumer behavior toward a preference
for advertised products and services); id. at 15:30 (explaining the “surveillance capitalism”
business model).
208. See Rani Molla, Twitter, Google and Facebook Have Banned Cryptocurrency Ads — But
These Networks Still Haven’t, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2018/3/19/17123674/cryptocurrencybitcoin-advertising-ban-microsoft-twitter-google-facebook-oath-snap (last updated Mar. 26, 2018,
1:43 PM) [https://perma.cc/TD7R-P4XF] (indicating that as of early 2018, Google’s digital
advertising revenue was nearly $85 billion, Facebook’s was about $50 billion, and Twitter’s was
$2.2 billion).
209. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 195.
210. Id.
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discussions—with respect to both securities regulation and the
increasing need for regulation of the internet and internet actors.
Regardless of where the conversation leads, and no matter what further
technology comes along, the fundamental principles of securities
regulation should be the touchstone that grounds any legal or
regulatory approach.
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